| The Right Honourable Lord Stirrup |
|
|---|---|
Sir Jock Stirrup in RAF service dress |
|
| Nickname | Jock |
| Born | 4 December 1949 |
| Allegiance | United Kingdom |
| Service/branch | Royal Air Force |
| Years of service | c. 1968–2010 |
| Rank | Air Chief Marshal |
| Commands held | No. 2 Squadron RAF Marham No. 1 Group Chief of the Air Staff Chief of the Defence Staff |
| Battles/wars | Dhofar War Cold War Operation Telic War in Afghanistan |
| Awards | Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath Air Force Cross |
Air Chief Marshal Graham Eric "Jock" Stirrup, Baron Stirrup, GCB, AFC, FRAeS, FCMI, RAF, (born 4 December 1949) is a former senior Royal Air Force commander, who was the Chief of the Defence Staff from 2006 until his retirement in late 2010. He is also a Crossbench member of the House of Lords.
As a junior RAF officer, he was a fast jet pilot, seeing action in the Dhofar War. Later in his career, Stirrup commanded No. 2 Squadron and RAF Marham. After several senior air force appointments, Stirrup was made the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Strike Command and during this time he served as the first commander of British forces engaged in fighting the Taliban.
In 2002, Stirrup was appointed the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff responsible for equipment and capability and was heavily involved in procuring equipment for the invasion of Iraq. Spending a little over a year in that role, he was then appointed the Chief of the Air Staff, in which capacity he served from 2003 to 2006.
Stirrup retired as Chief of the Defence Staff on Friday 29 October 2010, to be succeeded by General Sir David Richards, the former Chief of the General Staff.
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Graham Eric Stirrup was born on 4 December 1949, the son of William Hamilton Stirrup and his wife, Jacqueline Brenda Stirrup (née Coulson). He was educated at Merchant Taylors' School in Northwood, Hertfordshire.[1]
Stirrup married Mary Alexandra Elliott in 1976 and they have one son.[2] Stirrup includes golf, music, theatre and history among his interests.[3]
Stirrup started his military career at the RAF College Cranwell in Lincolnshire in the late 1960s and it was from Cranwell that he received his commission in 1970. After completing flying training, Stirrup entered productive service as a pilot. After being graded as a Qualified Flying Instructor, he instructed student pilots. From 1973 to 1975, Stirrup was on loan service with the Sultan of Oman’s Air Force.[2] While in Oman Stirrup flew BAC Strikemasters during the Dhofar War in the close air support and interdiction roles,[4] giving him valuable battle experience of the use of air power in counter-insurgency operations. After he returned to Great Britain in 1975, Stirrup was posted to No. 41 Squadron where he flew the SEPECAT Jaguar in the fighter reconnaissance role.[2] Stirrup went on to serve in an exchange tour in the United States where he flew the all-weather tactical reconnaissance RF-4C Phantom.[5]
In March 1983, Stirrup, by then a squadron leader, was serving as a flight commander on No. 226 Operational Conversion Unit which was based at RAF Lossiemouth. His duties centred around the instruction of trainee pilots on the SEPECAT Jaguar. On 7 March 1983, Stirrup was carrying out a student progress check from the rear seat of his aircraft when they suffered a serious bird strike. Stirrup was unable to ascertain whether his student was conscious and forward vision through the canopy was obscured. One of his engines caught fire, and although ejecting from the aircraft would have been justified, not knowing whether the student was conscious or not, Stirrup managed to land at RAF Leuchars. Stirrup was later awarded the Air Force Cross for his actions.[6]
In 1985 Stirrup received a command appointment, as the Officer Commanding No. 2 Squadron which at that time was operating the Jaguar from RAF Laarbruch in Germany. Along with other NATO air units, his squadron's role was the air defence of Western Europe in the face of the Soviet Cold War threat. Stirrup gained first hand experience of the higher-level workings of the RAF when, in 1987, he was appointed Personal Staff Officer to the Chief of the Air Staff.[5]
From 1990 to 1992, Stirrup served as Station Commander of RAF Marham[7] and during his time in command, RAF Marham's strike aircraft were dispatched to the Middle East, seeing action in the Gulf War air campaign.[8] In 1993 Stirrup attended the Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS) and his course colleagues included Sir Timothy Granville-Chapman, who would later serve as his deputy (Granville-Chapman was Vice Chief of the Defence Staff from 2005 to 2009). After completing the course, Stirrup was appointed Director of Air Force Plans and Programmes in 1994. He was appointed Air Officer Commanding No. 1 Group in 1997, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff in 1998 and Deputy Commander-in-Chief RAF Strike Command in 2000. His appointment at Strike Command also entailed taking on the additional roles of being the Commander of NATO's Combined Air Operations Centre 9 (based at High Wycombe) and serving as the Director of the European Air Group.[5]
From September 2001 to January 2002, Stirrup was UK National Contingent Commander for Operation Veritas (British operations against the Taliban) in Afghanistan, his first direct experience of front-line operations overseas since 1987. In this role Stirrup directed the British contribution to the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom and he was the Senior British Military Advisor to General Tommy Franks, the Commander-in-Chief of United States Central Command.[9] Stirrup was replaced by Lieutenant General Cedric Delves.[10]
In April 2002 Stirrup was appointed Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Equipment Capability), a post he held until May 2003.[2] His main task was production of equipment plans for the Army, Air Force and Navy while ensuring that the plans could be afforded over the coming years. The planning for the invasion of Iraq required new equipment and Stirrup became increasingly involved in planning for urgent operational requirements. A particular difficulty faced by Stirrup was the need to place equipment orders with industry before the Government was prepared to publicly commit to the action. Stirrup briefed ministers on this point but was prevented from placing the orders according to his desired timescale. In the end some critical items such as body armour, boots and desert clothing were not available to all the personnel who needed them when they deployed.[11][12]
Stirrup was promoted to Air Chief Marshal[13] and appointed Chief of the Air Staff on 1 August 2003. In July 2004 Stirrup set out his strategic direction for the RAF which was based upon working to achieve an increasingly modern and multi-role aircraft fleet, reducing the number of RAF stations by creating fewer but larger and better-equipped bases and reducing the number of personnel while maintaining or improving their training.[14] Stirrup remained as the professional head of the RAF until 13 April 2006.
Stirrup was appointed Chief of the Defence Staff on 28 April 2006, making him the first RAF officer to hold Britain's senior military post since 1994. During Stirrup's time as CDS, the British Armed Forces saw significant involvement in both Iraq (Operation Telic) and Afghanistan (Operation Herrick). During Stirrup's time as Chief of Defence Staff unfunded Ministry of Defence commitments rose to £38bn. After his retirement, Stirrup stated that plans by himself and other Defence chiefs to bring the budget back into balance by making painful cuts were vetoed by Labour ministers.[15]
In May 2006, shortly after becoming CDS, Stirrup visited Iraq to assess the situation first hand. The British responsibility was in the south of Iraq and on his return Stirrup reported to the Defence Secretary that Basra was the key to success in southern Iraq. Stirrup identified two obstacles to success, the first being the militias and the second being the need for an acceptable level of Iraqi governance. In addition, he took the view that Iranian interference was a significant exacerbating factor. Noting that neither of two obstacles could be fully dealt with by the British Armed Forces, Stirrup viewed the solution as being essentially political.[11]
In order to take action against the militias, the local British commander in South East Iraq developed a plan to conduct aggressive operations against them. At the same time Stirrup became increasingly concerned that strong political leadership from the Iraqis was lacking and that without this any gains made by the military actions against the militias would be to no avail. In July 2006, Stirrup overturned the previous military advice to the Defence Secretary by stating that force levels in South East Iraq would need to be maintained. Previously it had been thought that they could be reduced from over 7,000 to between 3,000 and 4,000. In September 2006, the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, blocked the British plan to act against the militias which Stirrup believed was because of Maliki's dependence on Sadrist support at that stage.[11]
The original British plan was replaced by Operation Sinbad which was acceptable to the Iraqis and was executed from September 2006 to February 2007. Along with other Coalition commanders, Stirrup viewed Sinbad as insufficient because it did not involve directly attacking the militias. Believing that it would not deliver the level of improvements in security that the British wanted, Stirrup began looking at the high risk strategy of withdrawing British troops from inside Basra which would left the Iraqis in the position of either having to deal with the security problems themselves or lose control of Iraq's second city.[11]
Following the end of Operation Sinbad, the military situation for the British in Basra worsened and the British base at Basra Palace was repeatedly attacked. However, by summer 2007, Maliki's political position no longer depended on Sadrist support and Muqtada al-Sadr had publicly criticized Maliki. In July 2007 Maliki replaced his Basra security co-ordinator and during one of his visits to Iraq, Stirrup met the new Basra security co-ordinator, General Mohan. Mohan wanted the British forces to withdraw from Basra and Stirrup stressed that once British forces had departed, Mohan's Iraqi forces would have to deal with security. Both Mohan and Stirrup were clear that retaining British forces outside Basra would be an insurance policy against a deteriorating situation within Basra as well as give Mohan something additional with which he could threaten the militias. Stirrup was concerned that a redeployment would look as though the British had been "bombed out of Basra" but judged that this was preferable to the significant damage to British military reputation were security in Basra to completely break down.[11] Much of the British redeployment took place in August and despite Stirrup making public statements to the effect that the withdrawal was part of the overall plan, some commentators judged that the British had been defeated in southern Iraq.[16] By early September all British troops had been withdrawn from Basra city to the airport to perform what was dubbed an "overwatch" role.[17]
After British troops had been withdrawn from Basra city, violence continued and General Mohan took some time to produce a plan for improving security. Notwithstanding the difficulties, the Basra Governorate was handed over to Provincial Iraqi Control in December 2007.[18] By early March 2008, General Mohan had produced a security plan with British support which was presented to General Petraeus and Prime Minister Maliki in Baghdad. The plan called for a six week period of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration starting in June 2008 before forcibly disarming the Mahdi Army and other non-Government/Coalition forces afterwards. Later in March Stirrup was in Baghdad and he met with General Petraeus and General Austin, the commander of the Multi-National Corps – Iraq. Stirrup strongly backed Mohan's plan but noted that Mohan would need to be pressed hard to deliver and also supported with Corps forces. Austin was reluctant to provide support, wishing to focus on Mosul, but Petraeus agreed with Stirrup. However, this plan was overtaken by Maliki's decision to launch Operation Charge of the Knights. Both Stirrup and the American commanders were taken by surprise and were concerned about the lack of planning but Maliki was determined to launch his operation in late March.[11]
Operation Charge of the Knights led to the Battle of Basra which lasted from 25 to 31 March. Although the lack of planning resulted in some confusion, the Coalition did support the Iraqi action with land and air assets. By the end of March the Iraqi Government forces had negotiated a ceasefire with Muqtada al-Sadr. With the militias melting away, Iraqi Government forces were able to claim control of Basra. While recognizing that Operation Charge of the Knights had been far from perfect, Stirrup judged it to be a success as the Iraqis were taking responsibility for their own security.[19]
After the conclusion of Operation Charge of the Knights the British were involved in helping to rebuild those Iraq Army units which had suffered from poor cohesion, or even dissolved. In hindsight, Stirrup took the view that the British forces would have been usefully employed in mentoring the Iraq Army to greater extent earlier in the campaign.[11] In late April 2009, most British military operations in Iraq came to an end; and by 28 July 2009 all British forces had left Iraq and were all redeployed to Kuwait.[20]
After his appointment as CDS, Stirrup travelled to Helmand Province in May 2006. At that stage, the British effort consisted of a small tented base at Camp Bastion, an operating base at Lashkar Gah and several isolated platoon houses in the north of Helmand. Much of the rest of the Province was not under British or other ISAF control. At that time the insurgency was starting to gain strength and although by 2009 the British Armed Forces and the United States Marine Corps had greatly expanded their role and were providing security for over 50% of Helmand, speaking in 2009 Stirrup conceded that in some areas security had worsened. While, highlighting the inadequate force levels provided by NATO and the competing demands on Coalition political and military resources that Iraq had posed until 2008, Stirrup believed that by 2009 NATO forces were successfully taking the fight to the insugents, driving them out of towns and villages and thereby allowing governance to improve which would lead to the defeat of the insurgency.[21]
Speaking generally on operations in Afghanistan, Stirrup has noted that whilst "the military is a key, an essential element in dealing with those problems, but by and large these problems can only be resolved politically" and that he favoured a pragmatic approach to dealing with former members of the Taliban.[22] By December 2009, Stirrup was expressing his concern about falling levels of public support for the war in Afghanistan which he believed risked undermining the British effort. In particular Stirrup called for a spirit of resolution and stated that the mission was achievable, noting that the British Armed Forces had finally now got a properly resourced plan to achieve the strategic aim.[23]
Following Prince Harry's early return from Afghanistan in 2008, Stirrup stated that the Prince might only be deployed in future if the risks involved "would be no higher than they would normally be in such circumstances".[24] In October 2010, in the weeks before the scheduled broadcast of the Channel 4's docudrama depicting what might happen if Prince Harry were kidnapped in Afghanistan, Stirrup wrote the Channel 4's chairman, Lord Burns, urging him to cancel the broadcast.[25][26]
In March 2007, while giving evidence to the Commons Defence Select Committee, Stirrup stated that the British Armed Forces were "very stretched" and drew the Committee's attention to the problems of insufficient training, recruitment and retention.[27] In June 2008, Stirrup reiterated his view that the British Armed Forces were overstretched. Stirrup stated that the Armed Forces did not have the structure or resources to continue fighting in both Iraq and Afghanistan, unless the British involvement in one of the conflicts was reduced to a small scale.[28] The following November, with plans in place to reduce Britain's military involvement in Iraq in place, Stirrup again went on the record stating that the operational tempo was too high and that as troops were withdrawn from Iraq, it would not be sustainable to make corresponding increases in troop numbers in Afghanistan. Stirrup also ruled out sending a British peace-keeping force to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.[29]
In mid 2008, the Labour government of then Prime Minister Gordon Brown extended Stirrup's term of office until 2011, which effectively prevented the three individual Service chiefs of the time, First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Jonathon Band, Chief of the Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy and Chief of the General Staff General Sir Richard Dannatt from competing for the UK's senior military position, for which the latter was widely assumed to be the front-runner.[30] In early January 2010, reports in the British press indicated that un-named senior officers and anonymous Whitehall sources were calling on him to stand down early, in order to make way for an Army officer - either the current Chief of the General Staff or Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff - with recent front-line operational experience.[31] However these calls were disregarded by the then Government and with his term of office extended, in March 2010, Stirrup became the longest serving CDS since Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Mountbatten in the 1960s.[32]
Following the election of the new Conservative-Liberal coalition government in May, Stirrup remained in his post. However, the following month he decided after consultation with the Defence Secretary to step aside in his role as Chief of the Defence Staff, an agreement said to have been reached amicably. The Defence Secretary, Dr. Liam Fox, took the unusual move of announcing the retirement of Stirrup in a Sunday newspaper rather than to Parliament, as is normal for these matters. When asked about potential successors, Fox said he wished for "the best people to be in the appropriate posts" after the conclusion of the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) due for completion in the autumn of 2010, the first since 1997.[33][34] The Defence Secretary stressed in unequivocal terms that Stirrup and the MoD's Permanent Secretary "had not been fired" and both had decided, or had already decided they were leaving after the transition to a new government was complete. The Defence Secretary's comments about Stirrup were said to have angered the Prime Minister, David Cameron, who saw this as an attempt by Liam Fox to undermine his authority as part of a continuing political rivalry.[35] The Foreign Secretary, William Hague, expressed similar sentiments to the Defence Secretary's about Stirrup's departure, saying it was the "natural point" for a change of personnel at the top of the armed forces following the conclusion of the Strategic Defence and Security Review in the autumn.[36]
Potential successors to the role of the Chief of the Defence Staff were senior British Army officers General Sir David Richards, the then Chief of the General Staff or General Sir Nicholas Houghton, Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff - Stirrup's immediate deputy.[37] Stirrup's retirement coincided with that of the Ministry of Defence's most senior civil servant, Sir Bill Jeffrey as its Permanent Secretary, whose term of office had also been extended under the previous Labour administration until at least 2011. On 14 July 2010, the Defence Secretary Liam Fox announced that General Sir David Richards, the then Head of the British Army, would succeed Stirrup as Chief of the Defence Staff in October 2010.[38]
Stirrup retired from his role as Chief of the Defence Staff, the head of the British Armed Forces, on Friday 29 October 2010 and was succeeded by the former Chief of the General Staff, General Sir David Richards.[39] Days before his departure from the role, Downing Street announced that Sir Jock would be appointed a crossbench non-political peer, having been recommended by the House of Lords Appointments Commission, his title and entrance to the Upper House will be decided later.[40][41]
Although it was made abundantly clear that the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Permanent Secretary had not been sacked or axed, critics, almost universally of former Army experience, have expressed their approval for their removal however it came about. Former Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Tootal, a commander of the first 1,200 troops into Helmand in 2001, expressed the opinion that Stirrup was accountable for a share of the "chronic mismanagement of the armed forces"; he went on to say that although there had been "a tendency to blame ministers" that it would be unwise to "ignore the role of the professional heads in the form of the CDS and the PUS, who advise our ministers on what the armed forces should look like and what they do". He further expressed the opinion that Stirrup should depart from his role as CDS before the Strategic Defence and Security Review was concluded, otherwise the "new Chief of the Defence Staff has actually to inherit what someone else has designed" meaning it would be difficult to change or alter what had already been put into force.[42][43]
The former British Army colonel and Conservative MP, Patrick Mercer, expressed satisfaction with the changes saying "The last regime allowed our men to go into Helmand improperly prepared, while huge sums of money were squandered on projects such as the refurbishment of the Ministry of Defence",[44] although the latter referred to contracts negotiated by Senior Civil Service in 1999-2000, some time before Sir Jock Stirrup was appointed. Former Colonel Tim Collins, who resigned in 2004 during the tenure of the then CDS General Sir Michael Walker citing chronic underfunding in the Army and then called for the RAF to be disbanded said: "Jock Stirrup was a well-known apologist for Labour muddled thinking over Afghanistan".[45] The former Army officer and Conservative MP Adam Holloway was quoted as saying the CDS had become a "...politician in uniform.." and that "officers are rewarded for sticking closely to the orthodoxy — and few are promoted for telling how it is.” [46]
The former Defence Minister Kevan Jones objected to the scapegoating of Stirrup, describing it as an "absolute disgrace". Jones also suggested that Fox and Cameron were seeking to put their own supporters in place and that it was they and not Stirrup who were attempting to politicise the armed forces.[47] The foreign policy writer Daniel Korski expressed the view that, although replacing Stirrup with an army officer may raise the morale of soldiers, it was absurd to suggest that the campaign in Afghanistan was failing because the Chief of the Defence Staff was an RAF officer, rather than an Army officer. Korski based his view on the multi-agency and tri-service nature of modern warfare.[48]
After becoming Chief of the Defence Staff, one of Stirrup's early decisions was to put an end to the debate about whether the British Armed Forces should purchase the Reaper Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. Stirrup decided that the Reapers were to be procured and No. 39 Squadron was subsequently re-established with Reapers.[11]
In June 2007, whilst speaking at Chatham House, Stirrup commented that Western militaries must be prepared to deal with the consequences of global warming.[49]
In September 2009, Stirrup made a visit to Israel, seeing the Israel Defense Forces's Chief of General Staff Gabi Ashkenazi and other senior commanders. During the visit, Anglo-Israeli military co-operation, the British operations in Afghanistan and the situation in the Middle East were discussed. Stirrup also visited the Palestinian Authority.[50]
Stirrup gave evidence to the Iraq Inquiry, a public inquiry into the UK's role in the Iraq War, on 1 February 2010.[51] On 3 February 2010 Stirrup stated that the merging of the three service branches of the British armed forces might be debated.[52][53]
Stirrup has received the following honours:
Stirrup is associated with the following organizations:
Stirrup's medal ribbons are arranged as shown:[60]
| Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath | |
| Air Force Cross (AFC) | |
| Queen Elizabeth II Golden Jubilee Medal | |
| Omani General Service Medal (Sultan Qaboos) | |
| Omani As Samood Medal (Endurance Medal) |
In January 2011, he was created a life peer as Baron Stirrup of Marylebone in the City of Westminster, and he was introduced in the House of Lords on 1 February 2011, where he will sit on the Crossbenches.[61]
| Insignia | Rank | Date of promotion | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Flight Cadet | c. 1968 | Entered military service. | |
| Pilot Officer | 31 July 1970 | On commissioning from RAF College Cranwell.[62] | |
| Flying Officer | 31 July 1971 | Seniority backdated to 31 January 1971.[63] | |
| Flight Lieutenant | 31 July 1973 | [64] | |
| Squadron Leader | 1 January 1980 | [65] | |
| Wing Commander | 1 July 1984 | [66] | |
| Group Captain | 1 January 1990 | [67] | |
| Air Commodore | 1 January 1994 | [68] | |
| Air Vice-Marshal | 1 July 1997 | [69] | |
| Air Marshal | 6 November 2000 | [70] | |
| Air Chief Marshal | 1 August 2003 | [71] |
| Military offices | ||
|---|---|---|
| Preceded by F J Hoare |
Officer Commanding No 2 Squadron 1985 – 1987 |
Succeeded by P O Sturley |
| Preceded by D F A Henderson |
Station Commander RAF Marham 1990 – 1992 |
Succeeded by N R Irving |
| Preceded by J R Day |
Director of Air Force Plans and Programmes 1994 – 1997 |
Succeeded by S M Nicholl |
| Preceded by J R Day |
Air Officer Commanding No 1 Group 1997 – 1998 |
Succeeded by J H Thompson |
| Preceded by T I Jenner |
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff 1998 – 2000 |
Succeeded by P O Sturley |
| Preceded by T I Jenner |
Deputy Commander-in-Chief Strike Command 2000 – 2002 |
Succeeded by Sir Brian Burridge |
| New title | UK National Contingent Commander for Operation Veritas Also Senior British Military Advisor to US CENTCOM 2001 – 2002 |
Succeeded by C N G Delves |
| Preceded by Sir Jeremy Blackham |
Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Equipment Capability) 2002 – 2003 |
Succeeded by Robert Fulton |
| Preceded by Sir Peter Squire |
Chief of the Air Staff 2003 – 2006 |
Succeeded by Sir Glenn Torpy |
| Preceded by Sir Michael Walker |
Chief of the Defence Staff 2006 – 2010 |
Succeeded by Sir David Richards |
| Honorary titles | ||
| Preceded by Sir Richard Johns |
Honorary Colonel of 73 Engineer Regiment (Volunteers) 1 April 2002 – 29 July 2008 |
Succeeded by Sir Glenn Torpy |
|
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